The major statute on takeovers is the Companies Amendment Act 1963, which regulates process and is referred to as a 'pause and publicity statute ' (Takeovers Panel, 1995) . It provides lor a mandatory period of notice, and lor details ol die oiler to be given to shareholders of die target company where die takeover offer is made in writing, but does not regulate oral oilers or stands in die market.1 It does not control die price to be offered, nor does it require equal treatment ol holders ol die same class of shares. Neidicr does it prohibit partial bids. The Act is udliscd in limited circumstances, such as when a bidder faces a widespread shareholding in a target company, is concerned to acquire complete control ol a company, or is making a scrip, pardal or conditional offer (McKenzie, 1995) . Consequendy, the Act has only a marginal impact upon takeover reguladon.
In 1981 die New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSE) introduced a takeovers code into its listing rules. The code provided diat all shareholders of die same class ol shares were to be treated 'similarly' by die offerer, and required diat subsequent offers to shareholders be made on 'no less favourable terms' to prior offers made when a takeover was 'reasonably in contempladon'. Any increase in die amount offered for shares, whether on the market or by private treaty, had to be passed on to other offerees, whcdier or not diere had already been an acceptance.
The code as a whole was of limited effect: as its sanedons applied only to listed companies, offers made by private individuals or lion-listed corporadons were not susceptible to the NZSE's sanedons (Eitzsimons, 1994a) . In addidon, where a takeover took place in breach of die lisdng rules, a dircat to delist die target company would harm die shareholders who had not taken up die offer. The code was cridcised as being largely ineffeedve (NZSC, 1988) , but its provisions were essentially repeated in the 1989 edidon of the lisdng rules.
Reform Proposals in the 1980s and 1990s
During 1986-89 stockmarket aedvity in New Zealand substantially increased, and in 1986 die Minister of Jusdce asked the New Zealand Securides Commission (NZSC) to undertake a review of insider trading and takeovers (Eitzsimons, 1994b) . The NZSC put forward two arguments for mandatory offers and equal price provisions. First, shareholders should be treated equally since the corporate contract to which die shareholders are a party provides for all shares to be ranked pari passu. As a result, any premium above die market price that a bidder paid should be shared by all shareholders, not just diose who had a significant or controlling interest in a company. Second, 'Takeover procedure should allow open compeddon for die control of a listed company . . . to operate in an informed and public securides market'. The aim was to 'bring fordi die highest compeddvc bid for control, and to enable die target shareholders, by an appropriate majority, to make an informed judgment to accept or reject dial bid' (NZSC, 1988:80) .
The government accepted the NZSC's proposals, but the Cabinet decided to defer it until after die proposed Companies Bill had been introduced (McKenzie, 1993) .
The government moved to introduce the Takeovers Bill at the end of 1991. The Bill established a Takeovers Panel, which was given a wide discretion in determining whether any kind of takeover code was needed and, if so, what specific provisions it should contain. The government's economic policies were also evident in this legislation as the Takeover Bill's objectives included providing a code that encouraged an efficient allocation of resources, and competition for corporate control. The Minister of Justice set up a Takeovers Panel Advisory Committee to begin work immediately on the new takeovers code. The Committee issued a draft code for discussion in 1993 which contained notice and pause provisions, as well as a mandatory offer provision and an equal price provision (Takeovers Panel Advisory Committee, 1993) .
Opponents of regulation argued that the real issue in die takeover regulation debate was not inequality of treatment of shareholders by bidders but die potendal for minority shareholders to be exploited by a successful bidder. Since diis issue concerned shareholders' rights and directors' dudes, diey argued, it should be dealt widi by appropriate corporate law (Pound, 1993) . In the face of this opposidon die government deferred any decision on whedier to legislate to enforce die code, on die understanding diat die problems diat takeovers posed for minority shareholders would be resolved by strengdiening shareholders' rights in die new Companies Act 1993.
Developments in 1994-95
However, die passage of die Companies Act 1993 did not end debate on takeovers law reform. The NZSE's proposed new lisdng rules in 1994 did not sadsfy die Minister of Jusdce, who appointed a Takeovers Panel to consider a code -a mere diree mondis after die Companies Act came into force.
The Panel reported back widi its proposed code in June 1995, which was unchanged from die 1993 final version. The Panel argued diat a transfer of control of a large number of companies had taken place widiout reference to 'all shareholders', and dial over 80 per cent of companies on die New Zealand stockmarket had a shareholder who held at least 20 per cent of die vodng securides. The Panel pointed out dial if die assets of a company had been sold, or if a change in die direcdon of a company was proposed, dien die Companies Act 1993 would have required shareholder approval. The Panel used diis requirement to argue that, as control of assets could be also be obtained by acquisidon of a controlling interest in a company, a takeover should similarly require shareholder approval or an offer to all shareholders.
The Panel also argued dial its proposed code could have a posidve impact on foreign investment in New Zealand 'as it provide [d] greater protecdon and more transparency dian exisdng law' and would provide 'investors from die Pacific Rim with protection comparable to that which they enjoyed in their homes markets' (Takeovers Panel, 1995:18) .
The code's fundamental rule was dial a person was prevented from controlling more than 20 per cent of die voting rights of a company 'unless an oder is made under die Code to all shareholders on die same terms ensuring equal treatment ol all shareholders ' (Takeovers Panel, 1995:2) . The purpose of die 20 per cent limit was to 'ensure diat till shareholders Icouldl participate in die transfer of control' (Takeovers Panel, 1995:4) . The code was also designed to ensure diat corporate control was contestable by requiring a controlling shareholder to make an oder lor majority control if diat shareholder opposed a liosdle bid. The Panel rejected an argument diat requiring disclosure would prevent takeovers. In die Panel's view, to die extent diat diere was free-riding, an auedon process would better serve die interests of target shareholders, and in any event a bidder would still benefit if diere was a rival bidder to whom it could sell its stake if it wished.
The release of die Panel's recommended code did not end die debate. While die Minister of Justice had indicated diat he supported a code, even before die Panel released its report, he failed to persuade die cabinet of die need for it. He dien announced diat die code would be deferred while furdier consideradon was given to die sufficiency of die NZSE's lisdng rules as a means to protect minority shareholders.
Evidence Against Mandatory Offer and Equal Price Provisions
Evidence from odier countries suggests dial target shareholders experience posidve abnormal returns from takeovers, which result from efficiency gains radier dian wealth transfers (Romano, 1993) . Four studies have been undertaken of die effects of takeovers on shareholder wealth in New Zealand. In its submission on die NZSC's (1983) proposals, die Treasury referred to a study undertaken by Cambie (1983) , who measured die average percentage gain above die pre-offer share price lor bodi shareholders of targets and offerers over die period from eight weeks before to two weeks alter die announcement of a takeover bid during 1968-81. He found an average gain of 28 per cent for target shareholders and an average loss of minus 3 per cent for bidder shareholders. The Treasury argued diat what was important was die overall gain derived, taking gains to die target and bidder as a unit. The Treasury (1984:11) commented:
The lact diat most of die gains from takeovers accrue to die target shareholders is consistent with die hypothesis diat, at least on die bidder's side, die market for takeovers is a competitive market. If diis market were not competitive diere would be super-normal profits to be reaped, which would show up as increases in die bidders' stock price at die takeover event. The negadve stock price movements from takeover activity may be lower then rates of return to other investment aedvides. Such findings are not inconsistent, of course, widi die proposition diat takeovers are, in general, value creating transactions.
The second study was undertaken by Amcry and Emanuel, who examined the share price performance of New Zealand firms diat engaged in takeover activity during 1968-85. Amery and Emanuel (1988:15) observed the following:
• In die 51-wcek pre-offer period, bidder firms outperformed die market. Target and merger firms underperformed die market for most of diis period.
• Upon die announcement of an offer, significant and large abnormal gains, averaging 12.8 per cent, accrue to targets. In mergers, die average gain to a firm on an announcement is 6.9 per cent. On die odier hand, die market does not appear to react to die bidder firm upon announcement of an offer.
• In die interim period before outcome, die market reacts differendy to target firms as uncertainties regarding die success of die offer are resolved. There are gains to shareholders in successfully merged firms, but a portion of die gains to unsuccessful targets is lost. Bidders experience negadve abnormal returns on average during diis period.
• In die 26-week post-outcome period, bodi successful bidders and unsuccessful targets experience negadve abnormal returns. Unsuccessful bidders have zero abnormal returns. By die end of die post-outcome period, die (Cumulative Average Return] of unsuccessfully targets is approximately zero. It appears diat die gains generated on die oiler announcement are dependent on die target being combined widi anodier firm. Amery and Emanuel (1988:57) concluded diat: ft) lie results of diis study are consistent widi a market for corporate control which provides an efficient mechanism for die redeployment of assets to more productive uses or more efficient users as is dictated by changes in technology and consumer preferences.
More rccendy, Mandelbaum has produced two studies on die impact of takeovers on shareholder wealdi. The first of diese studies supported die argument dial takeovers created wealdi since target shareholders experienced positive gains at die time of die takeover announcements which were sustained only i f a takeover was successful (Mandelbaum, 1993a) . In odier cases, a company which had not been taken over initially, but which later received a successful offer, also experienced positive gains. By contrast, a company diat received an unsuccessful initial takeover offer which was not followed by a successful one gained abnormal returns only at die time of die announcement, which dissipated once die takeover offer was not accepted. Mandelbaum (1993a:30) concluded dial 'the source of gains in takeovers, for New Zealand listed companies during die period , is a result of expected wealdi created by die actual takeover offer taking place'. He also concluded diat liiere was no 'asymmetric information problem in the sense that bidders' management systematically holds superior information than the market regarding the future prospects of the target firm ' (1994:130) .
Mandelbaum's second study enquired whether shareholders in a target company are worse oil when a full takeover ofler is launched by a bidder who has already built a stake in the target company. He aimed to determine whether a mandatory bid rule was necessary in the light of the Takeovers Panel Advisory Committee's inclusion of a rule that, once a person acquired more than 20 per cent of the voting rights in a company, a partial or f ull offer to all the other shareholders had to be made. Mandelbaum found that, on average, remaining target shareholders 'gained significantly from full successful take-over offers in New Zealand during the period 1985-1990', and that, 'on average, target shareholders (including the minority) are better off as a result of a full take-over compared to their position prior to the bid, albeit to different extents'. He also pointed out that the evidence was 'inconsistent with the proposition that large controlling shareholders used their power to expropriate or consume corporate wealth at die expense of odier shareholders' (Mandelbaum, 1993b:7), as one would not expect die controlling shareholders to pay remaining target shareholders posidve premiums. As well, he found diat die larger die initial stake held by die bidder prior to launching a takeover offer, die lower die premium paid to die remaining target shareholders. A possible reason for this was diat, die larger die inidal stake, die more likely a takeover becomes and die more heavily diis is reflected in die pre takeover price, reflecting the fact that the bidder has paid a differential posidve premium for full control.
Evidence Supporting a Takeovers Code
Supporters of a takeovers code diat includes mandatory offer and equal price provisions argue diat die differences between die structure of die New Zealand stock market and diat of stock markets elsewhere renders irrelevant overseas evidence on the eflects of takeovers, pardcularly as a mechanism to discipline management. The NZSC (1988) had earlier rejected die argument diat the stockmarket was efficient in die sense dial it incorporated all publicly available information into die share price. As a result, it rejected die argument diat takeovers were wealdi creating and believed diat takeover bids were primarily made for undervalued targets, so dial, in the absence of mandatory offer and equal price provisions, takeovers transferred wealth from target shareholders to bidders. This view is undermined by Amery and Emanuel's and Mandelbaum's evidence diat gains to target companies' shareprices were dependent upon a successful takeover. If a bidder had identified an undervalued target, die market price should have made a positive gain irrespective of whedier die bid was successful, since die market would have dien been made aware of die undervaluation.
McKenzie (1995) argues dial Mandelbaum's study on die effects of successful takeover bids is of limited value as it deals widi bids f or all die shares and does not apply to partial bids or to cases of negotiated transfers of a controlling interest. He claims that the New Zealand stockmarket has significant features which need to be taken into account in considering overseas experience. As Mandelbaum (1993a) noted, over 80 per cent of listed companies have one shareholder owning 20 per cent or more of share capital, and 70 per cent of listed companies have one shareholder holding 30 per cent or more of the share capital. This means that corporate control can be transferred in 70 per cent to 80 per cent of listed companies without involving die remainder of diose companies' shareholders.
McKenzie dien notes die converse of diis point: 'it would be difficult for a bidder to acquire control widiout die consent of die shareholder who holds a 20 per cent plus parcel . . . This means diat in between 70 per cent to 80 per cent of New Zealand listed companies diere is no real prospect of a contested takeover and die takeover phenomenon loses its disciplining effect on management' (McKenzie, 1995:2) . The Takeovers Panel (1995:3) similarly argues diat W here shares are widely held, an outsider usually cannot accumulate a control parcel widiout making an offer to all shareholders. The dispersion of share ownership dius tends to promote widespread shareholder pardcipadon in a takeover. In diese circumstances, die pause and publicity rules enable shareholders to make an informed decision about die merits of an oder.
Evidence from Canada supports this point. like New Zealand, Canada has a stockmarket widi a greater concentradon of shareholdings dian die United States (Daniels & Halpcrn, 1995) . This evidence shows diat high share-ownership concentradon in public firms is correlated with reductions in firm value. This is because accountability problems exist in closely held corporations as well as in widely held corporations (as controlling shareholders may use dieir position to attain personal perquisites). However, a move to restrict alienability of controlling interests (as die Takeover Panel suggests) could, in such a concentrated market, have perverse effects by encouraging controlling shareholders to retain dieir shares in order to obtain maximum value from die firm, to die detriment of minority shareholders (Daniels and Halpern, 1995) . A feature of die New Zealand market diat perhaps ameliorates die impact of concentrated shareholdings is die presence of significant shareholdings by local and overseas institutional shareholders -up to 46 per cent of die shareholdings by 1993 (Walker & Fox, 1994 ) -who are not interested in personal perquisites. In Canada die presence of institutional ownership has been associated widi shareholder gains, despite die concentrated shareholdings (Daniels & Halpern, 1995) .
McKenzie (1995) identifies two odier distinct features of die New Zealand stock market. New Zealand is a small economy widi a small stockmarket, widiout die depth of some overseas markets. And, unlike die United States, New Zealand cannot rely upon shareholder litigation as a means of controlling directors, due to a number of factors including die high costs of litigation, die risk of an award of costs against a plaintiff, and die fact diat die size of New Zealand listed companies does not justify the litigation relating to the issue of corporate control. McKenzie takes the view that this constraint remains unaffected by the improved shareholder rights and remedies under die Companies Act 1993. Nor has die availability of contingent-fee lidgadon made any difference, due to 'die lidgadon culture in New Zealand ' (1995:4) . This view is supported by research by Ramsay (1995) into corporate lidgadon in Australia, which shows diat shareholder lidgadon is infrequent and unlikely to be a sufficient enforcement mechanism to control directors. McKenzie is further supported by the lack of enforcement acdons by shareholders against alleged insider traders in New Zealand (Fitzsimons, 1995) . Aldiough die NZSE's lisdng rules have provisions prevendng transacdons widi related pardes unless diere is a prior approval by ordinary rcsoludon, from die point of view of die shareholders diese rules suffer from die same drawback as die provisions of die Companies Act 1993 and related legisladon: the cost and difficulty of enforcement (Fitzsimons, 1994a) . Flic private right of action provided by die NZSE has been litde used, and, as Mandelbaum (1993c) notes, diere are a number of barriers to shareholders using diese provisions. The NZSE's Market Surveillance Panel lacks statutory powers and is limited to listed companies, while die New Zealand stockmarket does not have die equivalent of die Australian Securities Commission or die Securities and Exchange Commission of die US, which bodi have regulatory and enforcement roles in dieir respective jurisdictions (Fitzsimons, 1994c) .
McKenzie makes die lurdier point diat participants in die United States stockmarket, due to its size, will generally have a continuing presence in die market, widi die result dial diey will wish to protect dieir reputations in die eyes of shareholders and regulators. By contrast, an acquirer of shares in a company in New Zealand will often be unknown or from an offshore institution. McKenzie also notes that, in the United States, a controlling shareholder may have a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders in a takeover situation, whereas in New Zealand no such duty is imposed. Gaynor (1995) also argues for a code, on die basis diat private, noninstitutional, New Zealand investors had wididrawn from die market. He refers to studies that show such investors have declined in dieir ownership of die top 40 companies on die New Zealand Stock Exchange. In 1989 such ownership amounted to 40 per cent of diis group of companies, but had fallen to 22 per cent by May 1995.
By contrast, private investors in Australia increased dieir shareholding during 1991-94. The decline in die presence of private, noilinstitutional, New Zealand investors in the stockmarkel was also reflected in the decline ol managed funds investment in die top 40 companies from 16 per cent in 1989 to 13 per cent in 1994, which was an alternative means for private, noninstitutional New Zealand investors to invest in die stockmarket. Against this, however, Keenan (1995:21) points out diat:
Since the abolition of exchange control and die deregulation of die financial markets, local investors have sensibly moved to diversify internationally instead of putting all dieir eggs into a tiny (0.2 per cent of die world equity market) basket. Given that our equity market is amongst the smallest and least diversified of world markets, local investors should diversify more than others. Bodi private and institutional investors here have diversified internationally. . . Meanwhile, international portfolio investors, regardless of die pro-coders, have invested endiusiastically in our equity and bond markets.
Takeovers Regimes Adopted by New Zealand Listed Companies
The NZSE's takeovers code required listed companies to choose one of three options for inclusion in dieir constitutions by 31 December 1995. The three options were: an 'insider only' provision which required 15 days notice of an offer and a report from independent directors where die offer came from the comapny's officers; a 'general nodce and pause' provision requiring diree days nodce of an offer; and a more restricdve 'minority-veto' provision which required shareholders who did not receive an offer or received a lesser offer to hold a meeting to approve the acquisidon. By 31 December 1995, 127 companies had determined which regime diey would use. Nineteen companies chose die insider-only provision, while 103 companies chose the general nodce and pause provision. Only five companies opted for die minority-veto provision. Interesdngly, diese last companies tended to have reladvely open share registers (for example, die largest shareholder of Fletcher Challenge Ltd was die employee unit trust, which held 12.5 per cent of its shares). In a number of cases, directors attempted to have die minority-veto provision adopted but were forced to put forward die general nodce and pause provision in the face of opposidon mainly from domesdc insdtudonal shareholders (Fitzsimons, 1996) .
These figures tend to support die view dial shareholders who hold substandal, or controlling, interests in a company would support a regime which allowed diem to more easily transfer dieir shares and to obtain any premium for the sale of diose interests. Those companies diat voted lor a minority-veto provision did not have a single controlling shareholder; accordingly, management was not constrained in advocadng die minority-veto provision, which operates to ensure diat management can more easily defeat a change in control of a company.
In die small number of comapnies diat have adopted die minority-veto provision, it was usually supported by die overseas insdtudonal investors. However, 96 per cent of companies adopted one of die two least restricdve regimes at a dme when overseas investors had increased dieir ownership of die New Zealand stockmarket from 4.2 per cent in 1986 to 44 per cent by die end of 1993 (Walker & Fox, 1994) . This suggests diat overseas investors arc not unduly concerned about die lack of a takeovers code. Ironically, diis perhaps supports die Takeover Panel's (1995:18) comment diat foreigners pay more attendon to economic and polidcal factors dian to takeover rules in determining whedier to invest in a market.
If New Zealand remains economically and polidcally stable, it will become evident whedier New Zealand's regulatory environment for takeovers has caused overseas investors to re-evaluate their investment in New Zealand's stockmarket. The rise in overseas investment during 1986-93 leads one to expect that the absence of a takeovers code will have little or no effect on overseas investment in New Zealand.
Conclusion
After more than a decade of debate, New Zealand's takeovers regime has not followed die example of overseas jurisdictions. On three occasions, takeovers legislation or regulations have come close to being implemented, only to be deferred at the last moment. The Minister of Commerce, whose department is now responsible lor business law reform, could revive the takeovers code at a future date, but tliis would require either a significant shift in the opinion of the present cabinet or a change of government after tfie 1996 election.
New Zealand now has a mixture of limited statutory regulation ol certain offers under the Companies Amendment Act 1963, and the three possible regimes under the NZSE's 1994 listing rules. These regulahons do not require Üiat an offer must be made to all the shareholders or that a bidder must offer the same price to all the holders of the same class of shares. The minority-veto provision, which is the nearest NZSE option to the takeovers code, has been accepted in only a small number of listed companies.
The current regime clearly lavours shareholders who have controlling interests in listed companies. However, while there is evidence ol the wealth creating effects of takeovers, no evidence has been produced to show that any benefits of the Takeovers Panel's proposed code would be greater than the costs imposed. The concentrated nature of New Zealand's sharemarket makes it doubtful that the current regime will put pressure upon managements to perform or lace losing their positions in the absence of a transfer by a controlling shareholder ol its interest.
Minority shareholders, who are not at present in a position to protect their own interests, have to hope either that controlling shareholders act so as to increase the value of the company or that institutional shareholders will play a more active role in die management of companies. Unless there are reforms in die area of shareholder protection, greater reguladon of takeovers may perhaps be necessary. If diis issue could be resolved, die case for greater reguladon of takeovers in New Zealand would appear to lack substance.
